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D URING the survey period there were significant legislative and
administrative developments that affect all Texas practitioners in the
corporate and partnership areas. Unlike the last few annual survey peri-
ods, however, there were relatively few significant court decisions in these
areas.
I. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Corporations as General Partners
In 1975 the Texas Supreme Court decided Delaney v. Fidelity Lease
Ltd' That case involved the common practice of creating a limited part-
nership with a single, corporate general partner and having some of the
limited partner-investors serve as shareholders, directors, and officers of
the corporate general partner. In one of its more unfortunate business-
related holdings, the court concluded that a limited partner who acted as
an officer of the corporate general partner took part in the "control of the
business"2 and thereby became personally liable for the debts of the busi-
ness. Further, the court not only read "control of the business" broadly
but also concluded that a creditor might recover even though he was una-
ware of the putative limited partner and did not rely on his credit. Finally,
the court strongly intimated in a dictum that the question whether corpo-
rations generally had power to be general partners in limited partnerships
was still an open one in Texas.3 This dictum relied solely on earlier case
law4 and did not address the statutory provisions that were clearly in-
tended to allow a corporation to be a general partner.5
In 1978, in perhaps an even more unfortunate ruling, the Texas attorney
© Copyright 1980, by Robert W. Hamilton.
* B.A., Swarthmore College; J.D., University of Chicago. Vinson and Elkins Profes-
sor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law.
1. 517 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974), rev'd in part, 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.
1975). The case is discussed in Hamilton, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw.
L.J. 153 (1976).
2. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 6132a, § 8 (Vernon 1970).
3. 526 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. 1975).
4. Id. The court referred to Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 155 Tex. 612, 291
S.W.2d 312 (1956).
5. E.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02A(18) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (providing
that a corporation has the power to be a member in any partnership). See Hamilton, supra
note I, at 156.
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general released an opinion6 that sought to carry the implications of Dela-
ney to their logical conclusion and stated that corporations could not be
general partners in limited partnerships. It further asserted that certain
acts could be performed only by the unanimous vote of all the limited
partners, a practical impossibility in publicly held limited partnerships.
This opinion created general consternation, and much of it was quickly
withdrawn by the attorney general.
7
Since a significant number of all risk ventures in Texas take the form of
limited partnerships because of federal income tax considerations, 8 these
two developments threatened to create serious, if not devastating,
problems. In 1979 the Texas Legislature adopted amendments to the
Texas Uniform Partnership and Limited Partnership Acts that sought to
reverse completely the implications and holdings of both Delaney and H-
1229 and to give greater guidance as to what constitutes taking part in
"control of the business." First, the new statute specifically provides that
responsibility for partnership obligations against a limited partner may be
asserted only by "a person who transacts business with the partnership
reasonably believing that the limited partner is a general partner." 9 Sec-
ondly, a new section was added to list acts that do not constitute taking
part in control of the business. According to this section, the limited part-
ner may:
(1) Consult with and advise the general partners as to the conduct
of the business.
(2) Act as a surety, guarantor, or endorser for obligations of the
partnership or to provide collateral for its borrowing.
(3) Act as a contractor, agent, or employee of the partnership or of
a general partner.
(4) Act as an officer, director, or shareholder of a corporate gen-
eral partner.
(5) Approve, individually or by a majority of the limited partners
(by number, financial interest, or as otherwise provided in the certifi-
cate), material matters that are stated in the certificate, such as:
6. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1229 (1978). See Aldave, Corporations and Partner-
ships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 239, 246-47 (1979).
7. A portion was withdrawn "pending reconsideration" within a week of its issuance.
TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1229A (1978). Other parts of the opinion were withdrawn
several months later. Id. No. H-1321 (1978). This opinion is discussed in three letters from a
group of law professors to the attorney general that were later published. Bromberg, Bate-
man, Hamilton, Lebowitz, and Winship, Corporate General Partners, 16 TEX. ST. B. BULL.
SECTION CORP., BANKING & Bus. L., Sept. 1978, at 24; Unanimity Requirements in Limited
Partnershps, Id., Dec. 1978, at 3; Unanimity in Limited Partnerships no longer required by
Attorney General, Id., Mar. 1979, at 3.
8. See S. MORRIS, REAL ESTATE TAX PLANNING § 4.5 (1977); Haims & Strock, Fed-
eral Income Tax Classification of Limited Partnershos Formed Under the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnershp Act, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 489 (1978). See generally Katz, IRS Agrees to
Follow Tests of Partnership Recognition as Stated in Larson, 51 J. TAX. 12 (1979); Comment,
Viability of a Tax Shelter Vehicle Limited Partnershos with a Corporation as Sole General
Partner, 49 Miss. L.J. 469 (1978) (general overview of tax benefits).
9. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1980), amendedby 1979
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 723, § 2, at 1781.
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(A) Dissolution and winding up of the partnership.
(B) Amendment of the partnership certificate or agreement.
(C) Sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of
all or substantially all of the assets of the partnership other than in the
ordinary course of business.'°
Further, neither the possession of power to do these acts nor the actual
exercise of such power constitutes taking part in the control of the busi-
ness. Thirdly, this legislation specifically supersedes the portion of H- 1229
that held that certain acts could be performed only by the unanimous con-
sent of limited partners." Finally, to eliminate all remnants of Delaney,
both partnership acts were amended to provide specifically that the word
"person" as used in those acts includes a corporation, a general or limited
partnership, a trustee or trust, an executor, administrator, or estate, and a
natural person, and that "any person may be a partner unless the person
lacks capacity apart from this Act."' 12 This legislation should put to rest
any doubts that the corporate and partnership law of Texas might be inad-
equate for a modem industralized state in which limited partnerships are
often preferred investment vehicles.
The legislative changes described have been informally reviewed by the
Internal Revenue Service, which concluded that they do not endanger the
current favorable tax treatment of Texas partnerships and limited partner-
ships. 13
B. De Facto Mergers
In 1977 the court of civil appeals of Austin introduced the concept of
"de facto mergers" to Texas law. In Western Resources Life Insurance Co.
v. Gerhardt 14 it held that a successor corporation was liable for obligations
of a predecessor corporation even though the transfer transaction involved
solely an acquisition of assets, and the successor specifically did not as-
sume liabilities. In 1979 the legislature attempted to reverse this deci-
sion.' 5 Whether or not this attempt will be successful remains to be seen
because in some areas, such as products liability, the plaintiff has strong
equities in these "de facto merger" cases.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6-A (Vernon Supp. 1980), added by 1979
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 723, § 5, at 1782; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 2a (Vernon
Supp. 1980), added by 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 723, § 1, at 1781.
13. See Coleman & Bromberg, Comments of Bar Committee, 17 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. 23 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
14. 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
15. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 5.10B (Vernon Supp. 1980), added by 1979 Tex.
Gen. Laws, ch. 194, § 1, at 422. This section specifically provides that a disposition of all or
substantially all the assets of a corporation requiring special authorization of shareholders
"is not considered to be a merger or consolidation pursuant to this Act or otherwise," and
does not make the acquiring corporation liable for any obligations of the selling corporation




C. Minor Legislation in 1979
1. Corporations formed before 1955 (the date of enactment of the
Texas Business Corporation Act) now have perpetual existence despite the
fifty-year limitation of pre-TBCA Texas law.
16
2. The maximum criminal fine that may be imposed on corporations
convicted of violations of the Motor Fuels Tax is one half the amount
corporations may be fined for violations of other criminal statutes.1
7
3. An executor or personal representative of a deceased partner who is,
by agreement, "entitled to the place of the deceased partner in the firm" is
liable for partnership liabilities only to the extent of the deceased partner's
capital and the estate's assets.'
8
4. Amendments to the Texas Securities Act proposed by the Securities
Board were also adopted.' 9 These amendments did not make significant
substantive changes but were generally designed to make the Texas regis-
tration process more similar to the registration process under the Federal
Securities Act of 1933.20 Attorneys with Texas Securities Act problems
should routinely consult the current version of the Act since a large
number of sections were amended in 1979.
5. The legislature changed some of the basic ground rules relating to
the formation of domestic corporations and the filing of corporate docu-
ments with the secretary of state's office: a $100 franchise tax deposit must
now accompany articles of incorporation 2 and the requirement of filing
duplicate originals has been changed to allow filing one original and one
copy." The original-and-a-copy amendment is recognition of the virtually
universal use of high quality copying machines. The secretary of state
keeps the original and returns the copy with the appropriate certificate.
This change is applicable to all corporate and professional association
filings with the secretary of state where duplicate originals were previously
required.
16. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02A (Vernon Supp. 1980), as amended by 1979
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 96, § I, at 174.
17. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 9.018 (Vernon Supp. 1980), added by 1979 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 291, § 1, at 626. The reason for this limitation is unclear.
18. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 238A (Vernon Supp. 1980), added by 1979 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 46, § I, at 71; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-19 (Vernon Supp. 1980),
added by 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 46, § 2, at 71.
19. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 160, at 348. This enactment made many additions and
amendments to the Texas blue sky laws. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts 581-4 to -7, -
22 to -23, -29, -33, -35-1 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976).
21. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.06 (Vernon Supp. 1980), as amended by 1979 Tex.
Gen. Laws, ch. 89, § 1, at 161. Although minor, these changes created a mild furor when
they went into effect, because many of the members of the practicing bar were unaware of
them, and a large number of filings had to be held up or returned until the filing attorney
complied with the new requirements.
22. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 120, at 213. This revision amends several statutes. See,
e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1396-2.05 to -8.12, 1528e-f (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1963-1979); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. arts. 2.10-10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1980); TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.10-.11 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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D. Other Administrative Changes
Administrative changes23 by the secretary of state in the fall of 1979
were designed to reduce the crush of telephone calls going to the corpora-
tions division. A study showed that approximately seventy-eight percent
of all calls were terminated by a busy signal.24 A new computer is being
installed to reduce the response time for inquiries. In addition, the secre-
tary of state has agreed to make available microfiche containing the com-
puter index of corporations. By an initial investment of $285 (for a
microfiche reader) plus a payment (currently set at $7.10), an attorney may
obtain a current copy of all corporate information kept in the secretary of
state's computer. This service will not only reduce the telephone call load
but should also be a genuine convenience for attorneys. It will now be
possible, for example, to ascertain promptly whether a suggested name is
currently in use. The secretary of state has also opened two new post office
boxes: one to facilitate the routine filing of documents 25 and the other for
documents requiring special handling.26
Finally, the Ethics Committee of the Texas Bar Association concluded
that a lawyer or professional corporation may use "any name that is not
misleading as to the identity, responsibility or status of those practicing
thereunder," but that the use of impersonal or assumed names such as




The conceptual question of whether a partnership should be considered
as an aggregate of the individual partners or as an entity to some extent
independent of them continues to arise. Neither view is entirely appropri-
ate: in cases of doubt the policies underlying the substantive issue should
be considered, and in cases not resolvable by such policies, the entity ap-
proach should generally be preferred. 28 This issue was considered in Fidel-
ity & Casualty Co. v. Swayzer, 29 an insurance case. An automobile
insurance policy listed the named insured as follows:
Louis E. Brown & Frank Swayzer, Jr.
DBA S & B Trash Service
4630 Alvin
Houston, Harris, Texas 77051.
23. These changes are described in the Newsletter, 42 TEX. B.J., Nov. 1979 (unnum-
bered).
24. See Newsletter, 42 TEX. B.J., Oct. 1979 (unnumbered).
25. This address is Secretary of State, Corporations Division, P.O. Box 13697, Austin,
Texas 78711.
26. This address is Secretary of State, Corporations Division, Special Handling, P.O.
Box 12436, Austin, Texas 78711.
27. State Bar of Texas, Ethics Committee, Opinion No. 398 (1978), 42 TEX. B.J. 610
(1979).
28. See 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 151 (1973).
29. 583 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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The company refused to defend a claim arising out of an accident caused
by one Benjamin, an employee of a partnership called Southwest Specialty
Company; Swayzer was a partner in Southwest Specialty, but Southwest
Specialty was apparently unconnected with the business of S & B Trash
Service. The truck was registered in the name of Southwest Specialty
Company. Holding that the designation in the policy was "unambiguous,"
the court concluded that the policy did not cover the accident in question.
This conclusion inferentially follows the entity theory since Swayzer is a
named insured on the policy yet is not covered by the policy in his capacity
as a partner in another partnership.3" While the result apparently is that
Swayzer has no insurance coverage in the specific case, most partners
probably realize that each partnership business is sufficiently separate that
individual insurance policies should be obtained for each partnership. In
another case, Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial
Corp. ,31 the court held that a mortgage signed by a partnership effectively
created a lien on a piece of property held solely in the names of the indi-
vidual partners. This result, which might be cited as supporting an aggre-
gate theory, clearly seems to be contemplated by the real estate section of
the Uniform Partnership Act. 32 A final case, Royal v. Moore,3 3 held that
for venue purposes the "residence" of a partnership is the residence of the
individual partners rather than the location of the partnership business as
stated in the partnership agreement.
Other partnership cases decided during the survey period involve prima-
rily issues relating to dissolution and the right to an accounting. Hughes v.
Cole34 focused on whether a written agreement created a partnership at
will or a partnership for a term. This question becomes important only in
the event that one partner withdraws prematurely and the other seeks to
hold him liable for breach of contract for the premature withdrawal.35
That is precisely what happened in Hughes v. Cole; the agreement pro-
vided:
1. Jim Hughes hereby agrees to pay to Dennis Cole fifteen (15%)
percent of the taxable net income received by Jim Hughes through his
work in the Austin Prosthetics Center, Orthotic Division, said pay-
ments to be made semi-annually beginning January 1, 1975 through
July 1, 1978, with adjustments to be made annually at the end of each
taxable year reflecting the actual net taxable income received ...
Although Jim Hughes will be bound by this agreement and will be
required to make semi-annual payments representing 15% of the taxa-
ble net income received from his work at the Austin Prosthetics
Center, Orthotic Division, he is in no way bound by this Agreement to
30. The court relied on an early New York case that also applied the entity theory on
virtually identical facts. Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America, 227 N.Y. 175, 124 N.E. 789
(1919).
31. 586 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 10 (Vernon 1970).
33. 580 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
34. 585 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
35. See 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 28, § 190.
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remain with this Center and perform his work through this Center.36
The court had little difficulty in concluding that a partnership at will was
created. It declared there "is not ambiguity" in the contract, that "every
partnership is prima facie a partnership determinable at the will of anyone
of the persons who entered into it," and "the agreement makes it clear that
Hughes was in no way bound to remain at the Center or work there for
any specified period of time."'37 The Texas Uniform Partnership Act was
not mentioned. Rarely is language so free of ambiguity that constructional
aids are unnecessary. Here, the last clause of the second-quoted paragraph
appears to contradict the first clause in the same paragraph. Nevertheless,
the result reached seems reasonable, since the average, normal partnership
is one at will, and in cases of doubt that should be the preferred construc-
tion.
Another case, Mitchell Resort Enterprises, Inc. v. C & S Builders, Inc. ,38
held that a suit between partners for breach of fiduciary duty or negligence
cannot be maintained until after the partnership has been dissolved. The
court again relied upon common law without citing the Texas Uniform
Partnership Act, which rejects the "only at dissolution" rule at least for
actions for an accounting: 39 Section 22 allows such an action "whenever
other circumstances render it just and reasonable."4 Moreover, Professor
Bromberg's comments state that "[p]rior Texas cases have recognized the
right to an accounting only at dissolution; the Section goes considerably
beyond."'" It was not at all clear in this case, however, that what was
being demanded was an "account or accounting"; neither word was used
in plaintiff's petition and the plaintiff's attorney described the suit as in-
volving "breach of fiduciary duty or negligence.
'42
Whether or not suits between partners should be permitted prior to dis-
solution should be based on considerations of judicial efficiency and econ-
omy: a suit before dissolution should not be permitted if the same claim
will arise in a final accounting after dissolution and such a dissolution has
or almost certainly will occur. In some instances circumstances may exist
in which it is reasonable for partners to litigate their respective rights and
obligations within the context of a going partnership without dissolving the
partnership. Such circumstances are probably rare, however, since if dis-
agreements reach the point of litigation, one or more partners will usually
terminate the relationship. On the basis of the cryptic description of the
facts by the court in Mitchell Resort Enterprises it is not possible to deter-
mine how such considerations might have been applied in the specific case.
In Wolfe v. East Texas Seed Co. 4 3 the court applied section 35 of the
36. 585 S.W.2d at 867-68.
37. Id. at 869.
38. 570 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 22 (Vernon 1970).
40. Id. § 22(d).
41. Bromberg, Source and Comments, 17 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 353 (Vernon
1970).
42. 570 S.W.2d at 465.
43. 583 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd).
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Texas Uniform Partnership Act' to hold a former partner in a dissolved
partnership liable for post-dissolution obligations. The defendant had
been active in the partnership business before dissolution, the business was
continued under the same name, and no notice of dissolution was given to
the plaintiff who had dealt with the partnership prior to dissolution. Sec-
tion 35 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act squarely imposes liability on
the withdrawing partner in this situation.
Two cases involving post-dissolution accountings also arose during the
survey period. Stone City Attractions, Inc. v. Henderson4 5 involved a part-
nership engaged in the business of arranging concerts for "rock 'n' roll"
and "country" music. After two of the three partners were imprisoned for
marijuana violations, the remaining partner created a corporation, as-
signed his partnership interest to that corporation, and then apparently
funneled the profits from concerts into the corporation and paid expenses
from partnership funds. Not surprisingly, the court affirmed a judgment
holding that this arrangement violated the managing partner's fiduciary
duties and imposing a substantial dollar judgment against the managing
partner and his corporation. In Bailey v. Jackson4 6 the court held that the
burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish the value of his interest in
the partnership at the time of dissolution and the amount of post-dissolu-
tion profits earned by the other partner's continuing the business. Such
amounts, the court intimated, were jury questions, and it was improper to
appoint a receiver to inventory, appraise, and dispose of the partnership
assets. A summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was therefore re-
versed, and the case was remanded for trial.
B. Corporations
Piercing the Corporate Veil. The argument that the separate identity of an
insolvent corporation should be ignored and the officers, directors, or
shareholders held personally responsible for corporate obligations appears
in four appellate decisions published during the survey period.47 In only
one case was the shareholder held personally liable,48 and the peculiar
facts of that case indicate that liability might have been imposed on a the-
ory of fraud on creditors rather than on "piercing the corporate veil." The
Texas courts, guided by thoughtful opinions of the Texas Supreme
Court,49 appear to have developed a reasonable approach toward this
44. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 35 (Vernon 1970).
45. 571 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
46. 573 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
47. Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.);
William B. Roberts, Inc. v. McDrilling Co., 579 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Chris-
ti 1979, no writ); Mortgage & Trust, Inc. v. Bonner & Co., 572 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). One federal case also involved piercing the corporate
veil issues. Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1978).
48. Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.);
see text accompanying notes 57-62 infra.
49. The two leading cases most often cited are Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d




Mortgage & Trust, Inc. v. Bonner & Co. " is a straightforward case that
well illustrates the Texas approach. The issue was whether two corpora-
tions should be treated as "alter egos" of each other so that a mechanic's
lien on all the property of one was also a lien on the property of the other.
The two corporations had the same office address and the same directors
and officers, there were some financial transactions between them, and the
names were similar. In other respects, however, the two corporations ap-
peared to be distinct: for example, one was closely held while the other
had approximately 3,800 shareholders. Finally, the transactions did not
appear to be fraudulent or to cause injustice; no such claim was raised in
the pleadings. Not surprisingly, the court of civil appeals reversed the trial
court's conclusion that the two corporations were alter egos. The court's
general discussion of the criteria for corporate liability is worth citing at
length:
As a general rule, two or more corporations are separate and dis-
tinct legal entities, and the separate identity of each will not be disre-
garded in order to impose liability on one corporation for the acts of
another corporation merely because of: a) overlapping stock owner-
ship; b) a duplication of some or all of the directors or officers; or c) an
exercise of the control that stock ownership gives to stockholders.
Gentry v. Credit Plan Corporation of Houston, 528 S.W.2d 571, 573
(Tex. Sup. 1975). In some circumstances, however, the one corpora-
tion may be regarded as the "alter ego" of another where manage-
ment and operations are assimilated to the extent that the subsidiary
is simply a name or a conduit through which the parent conducts its
business. . . .The corporate entity may thus be disregarded where it
is used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality of operations ...
Accordingly, the "alter ego" theory, or other similar theories, will not
be utilized to disregard the corporate entity unless: 1) it is made to
appear that there is such a unity that the separateness of the corpora-
tion has ceased to exist; and 2) the facts are such that an adherence to
the fiction of the separate existence of the particular corporation
would, under the particular circumstances, sanction fraud or promote
injustice. 2
Perhaps the most interesting issue in these cases is raised by William B.
Roberts, Inc. v. McDriling Co.," involving an attempt to hold the sole
shareholder liable for a debt of the corporation. Roberts, the sole share-
holder, was placed on the witness stand and was questioned by the plain-
tiffs attorney:
50. Mr. Justice Cardozo's famous but unfortunate dictum that the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil is wrapped in the "mists of metaphor," Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244
N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926), probably explains the conceptual difficulties under
which courts have long labored in this area. After all, if a jurist as prestigious as Cardozo
proclaims that the area is unprincipled, it must be so. See generally Hamilton, The Corpo-
rate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 979 (1971).
51. 572 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. Id. at 348-49 (some citations omitted).
53. 579 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
1980]
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Q. Do you consider yourself personally responsible for the contracts
of the corporation which are made?
A. I feel like the corporation stands on its own. I do sign as chief
executive officer.
Q. Do you consider yourself personally responsible for the dealings
that the corporation makes through you?
A. I feel like that I am, yes.
Q. Do you believe when people deal with you and you put your
William B. Roberts, Inc. down on the contract and they are deal-
ing with you, do you believe because of your control of this cor-
poration that you are personally liable for the obligations that
you have contracted on behalf of this corporation, do you believe
that?
A. I believe that.
Q. Is that your position?
A. Yes.54
The plaintiff argued that this testimony constituted a judicial admission
that an alter ego relationship existed. This argument failed, however,
when the court concluded that the testimony was not clear and unequivo-
cal. 5 The court also concluded that given the facts there was no justifica-
tion for piercing the corporate veil; the court further suggested that it
would pierce the corporate veil "only under compelling circumstances,"
since such action "thereby destroy[s] an important fiction under which so
much of the business of the country is conducted."56
The one case that held a shareholder liable for corporate obligations is
Tigrett v. Pointer.5 7 Pointer was in the real estate business through his
corporation, Heritage Building Corporation. The corporation had equity
capital of $1,000; over the years the business was financed by informal
advances made by Pointer. These amounts were reflected on the books as
a "loan account," but were never evidenced by notes; no security was ob-
tained or interest payments made. On April 30, 1974, when the ledger
account showed a balance of over $480,000 owed to Pointer (and six days
after service of process in plaintiffs suit), entries were made in the books
showing that all the assets of the corporation -were transferred at book
value to Pointer in reduction of the debt owed to him. Corresponding en-
tries were made in Pointer's personal books and, on the same day, book
entries were made showing Pointer's transfer of the same assets to another
wholly owned corporation, the Heritage Corporation. As in the case of
54. Id. at 344.
55. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Carr, 242 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1951, writ refd), sets forth five requirements for a judicial admission: (i) the state-
ment must be made during a judicial proceeding; (2) the statement must be contrary to an
essential fact or defense asserted by the person giving the testimony; (3) the statement must
be deliberate, clear, and unequivocal; (4) giving conclusive effect to the statement must be
consistent with the public policy upon which the rule is based; and (5) the statement must
not be destructive of the opposing party's theory of recovery.
56. 579 S.W.2d at 345.
57. 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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many complex transactions, these transfers were not made cleanly. Deeds
were not executed for several days; some property was transferred directly
from Heritage Building Company to the Heritage Corporation; new
stationery was printed, but the name on the office door was never changed;
and so forth. Further, the old corporation did not completely shut down
operations: Pointer transferred some cash to it from time to time, and in at
least one year its records showed a profit. The source of this profit is not
clear from the court's opinion, but the dissenting opinion states that the
bulk of it represented gain from the sale of an apartment house that had
been transferred to Pointer and Heritage Corporation and then transferred
back; the reason for these transfers is also unclear." Also, franchise taxes
were paid regularly for the old corporation, and apparently the financial
records and corporate books of Heritage Building Company were duly
maintained.
The transfer from the Heritage Building Company to Pointer and the
Heritage Corporation, as an abstract matter, might be analyzed in various
ways:
1. If Pointer's "loan" is really a form of capital contribution, the distribu-
tion of assets to him may be a fraud on creditors under common law prin-
ciples. 9 In effect, the transaction constitutes an irregular distribution of
assets to a shareholder without making provision for the corporation's
debts.
2. If Pointer's "loan" is recognized as a debt on a parity with the plain-
tiff's, repayment of Pointer's debt rather than the plaintiffs might be a
breach of fiduciary duty, a species of self-dealing,6" since Pointer elected to
repay his own loan first.
3. If Pointer's "loan" is recognized as a debt on a parity with the plain-
tiffs, but the corporation is insolvent, Texas's ubiquitous "trust fund" doc-
trine might come into play to set aside the preference given to Pointer.
61
This doctrine provides that the assets of an insolvent and inactive corpora-
tion become a "trust fund" for all creditors and the directors become
"trustees" for all the creditors.
62
4. The various corporations and Pointer individually might be consid-
58. When asked why he structured the transaction this way, Pointer responded "I was
trying to get money in there to pay those bills with." Id. at 390. While the dissent quotes this
remark to show that the Heritage Building Corporation was a continuing corporation after
the October 1974 transaction, it also cuts the other way, since it virtually admits that Pointer
transferred assets out of the corpooration, leaving significant unpaid indebtedness.
59. "This court has held that a corporation cannot disable itself from responding for its
debts by distributing its assets among its shareholders and leaving without remedy those
having valid claims. In such a case, we have held that a creditor injured by such distribution
of assets may proceed by an appropriate suit against such stockholders, to enforce the pay-
ment of its claim against the corporation." A.R. Clark Inv. Co. v. Green, 375 S.W.2d 425,
437 (Tex. 1964).
60. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 212 (1974).
61. Fagan v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1973, no writ), discussed in Lebowitz, Recent Developments in Texas Corporalion
Law-Part! , 28 Sw. L.J. 641, 757-61 (1974).
62. See 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 28, § 734.
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ered "alter egos;" if so each becomes liable for plaintiffs claim under a
"piercing the corporate veil" theory.
While the last theory, the one adopted by the court, seems inherently the
least plausible, there were procedural and substantive problems with each
of the others. For example, neither the trust fund doctrine nor a breach of
fiduciary duties was pleaded and, as the dissent points out, it is not at all
clear whether the trust fund doctrine should be applied to an active corpo-
ration such as was involved here. There was also a trial court finding that
the April 30, 1974, transfers were made without any intent to defraud, to
evade a legal obligation, to protect a claim, or to justify a wrong.
On the facts, strong equities favor the plaintiff. After all, the plaintiff
originally had a claim against a corporation with substantial assets; then,
the assets of the corporation but not its liabilities were transferred to a new
corporation under the same owners, and the old corporation no longer had
sufficient assets to discharge its liabilities. The fact that the transfers were
effected by book entries reducing some questionable "loans" by the princi-
pal shareholder should not hide the true nature of the transaction.
Given these circumstances it is not surprising that the court of civil ap-
peals reversed and rendered for the plaintiff; its opinion is a confusing one
that talks about various doctrines but applies an "alter ego" principle. One
judge dissented, pointing out quite correctly the logical flaws in the major-
ity opinion. The supreme court dismissed the writ, "no reversible error,"
thereby not giving precedential value to the lower court opinion.
Walker v. Newgent63 is a diversity case arising in the Southern District
of Texas. Plaintiff sought to obtain jurisdiction in that district over Adam
Opel AG (Opel) in a suit based on an accident in Germany. Opel is a
German corporation with no place of business in the United States; it is,
however, a wholly owned subsidiary of General Motors, and some of the
cars it manufactures are distributed in the United States, including Texas,
by other subsidiaries of General Motors. The plaintiff argued that the re-
lationship between General Motors and Opel was such that General Mo-
tors' business in Texas could be imputed to the subsidiary under Reul v.
Sahara Hotel.64 Pointing out that most cases involved the converse situa-
tion, that is attempts to hold a parent corporation liable based on the
Texas-related activities of a subsidiary, the court concluded that, on the
facts, the degree of control was not great enough to justify exercise of juris-
diction over Opel.65
Article 12.14 of the Texas Franchise Tax Act. Article 12.14 of the Texas
Franchise Tax Act 6 6 imposes personal liability for corporate obligations on
certain officers of corporations whose charters have been forfeited for non-
payment of franchise taxes. Prior to its amendment in 1977, the test of
63. 583 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1978).
64. 372 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
65. This conclusion was based on a mixture of common law, statutory, and constitu-
tional reasons. 583 F.2d at 166-68.
66. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.14 (Vernon 1969).
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liability under article 12.14 was whether the post-forfeiture debt was cre-
ated or incurred "with [the officer's] knowledge, approval and consent."67
One case68 arising under this statute during the survey period upheld a
jury verdict that the defendant did not have the requisite knowledge. The
court further rejected the argument that the sole shareholder was person-
ally liable because forfeiture under article 12.14 had caused a dissolution
and had vested the assets and liabilities in the shareholder. The conclusion
that "forfeiture" does not equal "dissolution" is based on the reinstatement
provisions of the Franchise Tax Act;6 9 prior case law reached the same
result.7"
Due Process in Private Associations. Two cases arising during the survey
period raise basic questions about the judicial reviewability of decisions by
private associations. Adams v. American Quarter Horse Association7 in-
volved the refusal of the association to register a filly, an essential step if
the animal is to become breeding stock. NAACP of Houston Metropolitan
Council v. NAACP72 involved the removal of the executive secretary of the
Houston Metropolitan Council of NAACP by the national office. Both of
these cases involved judicial review of private organizations' discretionary
decisions that had significant impact upon individual members of the or-
ganization. If these had been governmental organizations the procedural
rules would be established by constitutional and statutory provisions.
Clearly, a different kind of standard must be applied when reviewing a
decision by a private organization.
Both organizations had adopted rules that describe in greater or lesser
detail the substantive standards to be applied and procedures to be fol-
lowed in resolving disputes. In addition, however, Texas law recognizes
that such organizations must follow "traditional notions of due process,"7 3
or "elemental due process."74 This requirement is particularly important
in organizations such as the quarterhorse association whose bylaws do not
describe specific procedures. The "essential elements" of due process, the
Texas court stated, "are notice and an opportunity to be heard and to de-
fend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case" and "a
fair hearing after due notice by procedure analogous to judicial proceed-
67. In 1977 this test was changed to "(1) over his objection, or (2) without his
knowledge, if the exercise of reasonable diligence to acquaint himself with the affairs of the
corporation would not have revealed the intention to create the debt," and it was made clear
that this was an affirmative defense to be established by the defendants. Id. art. 12.14(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1980), as amended by 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 671, § I, at 1692.
68. Longoria v. Atlantic Gulf Enterprises, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
69. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.17 (Vernon 1969).
70. McGown v. Kittel, 480 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
71. 583 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
72. 460 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
73. 583 S.W.2d at 834.
74. 460 F. Supp. at 589.
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ings."75 Presumably, the decision must also have some rational relation-
ship with the policies of the association and not constitute "unfair
discrimination. '"76 Both courts concluded that these procedural require-
ments had been met by the associations and declined to interfere with their
decisions.
Authority of Officers. Litigation continues to arise in Texas relating to the
implied authority of officers. The legal literature has pointed out that
Texas case law presents essentially inconsistent principles as to this issue.77
The principal case during the survey period involving this question,
Retama Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. v. Cole,78 does little to clear up the
confusion, and indeed may make matters worse. In Retama the president
(and a member of the board of directors) entered into a substantial but
oral construction contract without any express authority from the board.
The court stated that holding the office of president of a corporation "does
not give [a person] power to bind the corporation except as to routine mat-
ters arising in the ordinary course of business. ' 79 However, the court also
held that authority "may at times be inferred from the circumstances sur-
rounding the acts" and that "the silence of the board of directors and their
acquiescence in the transactions which preceded and followed the oral
contracts [are] sufficient evidence of apparent authority."8 Even though
there is nothing in the appellate court's opinion to indicate that the board
was aware of the president's activities, or even who the members of the
board were, the court concluded that the directors "made no effort to stop
these activities but actually sat by and received the benefits of Cole's
knowledge in preparing the . . . site for construction."'"
It is probably wise to give corporate officers greater implied authority
than some of the Texas case law suggests. The basic problem with the
reasoning in Retama, however, is that it broadens inherent authority by
indirection and the use of a fiction: the same argument based on silence
and acquiescence could be employed in almost every case in which the
board is not consulted about a transaction. The portions of the opinion
quoted above also reflect confusion between actual and apparent author-
ity; if there is implied or actual acquiescence, the authority granted is ac-
tual rather than apparent. The confusion arises from the fact that the same
conduct, in this case silence, may often be cited to support findings of ei-
ther actual or apparent authority. It should also be observed that to the
extent there is approving silence combined with a receipt of benefits, the
concepts of "ratification" or "estoppel" perhaps fit more closely than "ap-
75. 583 S.W.2d at 834.
76. Id. at 837.
77. See 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 28, § 585.
78. 582 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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parent authority., 82
Finally, in a case that has been to the Amarillo court of appeals three
times and on which the Texas Supreme Court has written twice,83 it was
established that a corporation cannot be assessed exemplary damages in
the absence of a finding of malicious or willful conduct by some corporate
officer or director.
84
Jurisdiction and Venue. Numerically, the largest number of cases involv-
ing corporations that arose during the survey period related to questions of
venue or jurisdiction. Most of these cases, however, routinely applied es-
tablished principles to various factual situations. For example, four
cases85 involved the issue of whether a foreign corporation was amenable
to service of process under the Texas long arm statute.86 These cases ap-
plied a two-fold test: (1) Is the nonresident defendant amenable to process
under the long arm statute? (2) Is the exercise of personal jurisdiction
consistent with the requirements of due process?87
Another case involved article 202988 of the Texas statutes, a procedural
statute that dates back to 1854. It authorizes service of the citation upon
"the President, Vice President, Secretary, Cashier, Assistant Cashier, or
82. For a general discussion of the closely related doctrines of estoppel, ratification, and
actual and apparent authority, see 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 28, § 586.
83. Maxey v. Texas Commerce Bank, 571 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978),
writ ref'dn.r.e. per curiam, 580 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1979); Maxey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 489
S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), rev'd, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.1974); Citizens
Nat'l Bank v. Maxey, 461 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
84. Maxey v. Texas Commerce Bank, 571 S.W.2d 39, 49-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1978), writ refdn.r.e per curiam, 580 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1979). On the other hand, a corpora-
tion may be liable for civil penalties for violating an injunction because of acts by agents
within the scope of their authority and for the benefit of the corporation even though the
corporation formally instructs the agents to obey the injunction. Medical Slenderizing, Inc.
v. State, 579 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
85. Docutel Corp. v. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (French corporation
amenable to suit for breach of contract in Texas where contract was negotiated in Texas,
representatives visit Texas, the product sold is to be manufactured in Texas, and defendant
had dealings with other computer-related Texas corporations; second French corporation
also amenable to suit by reason of "continuous and substantial" contacts in state even
though cause of action does not arise from these contacts); Michigan Gen. Corp. v. Mod-U-
Kraf Homes, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suit for
breach of merger agreement; Virginia corporation held amenable to suit when agreement
was substantially negotiated in Texas, was partially performed in Texas, defendant's repre-
sentatives were physically in Texas on three occasions to negotiate agreement, and the regis-
tration expenses sued for were expended in Texas); Computer Synergy Corp. v. Business
Sys. Prods., Inc., 582 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, no writ) (for-
eign corporation not amenable to suit in Texas where only contacts were the shipment of
goods FOB California into Texas and the mailing of checks in Texas to the defendant in
California); Motiograph, Inc. v. Check-Out Sys., Inc., 573 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1978, writ ref'd) (South Carolina corporation held amenable to suit in Texas where
it purchased products from Texas corporation and sent three employees to Texas for techni-
cal training).
86. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980).
87. This analysis is based on the Texas Supreme Court's holding in U-Anchor Advertis-
ing, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978), and was
approved by that court through its refusal of a writ of error in Motiograph, Inc. v. Check-
Out Sys., Inc., 573 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd).
88. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 2029 (Vernon 1964).
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Treasurer" of any "incorporated company." The plaintiff sought to invoke
this article to justify service on a foreign corporation that was not qualified
to transact business in Texas by serving the president, who happened to be
in Dallas for a boat show.89 No effort was made to comply with the Texas
long arm statute. The attempt failed, however, and the court held that the
exclusive method of serving unqualified corporations is article 2031b.9"
Earlier holdings had made it clear that the Texas Business Corporation
Act provides the exclusive manner of serving domestic corporations and
foreign corporations that had qualified to transact business in Texas.9
This case, therefore, clearly indicates that article 2029 is obsolete. In a
somewhat related case, the court held that a suit to recover the civil pen-
alty set forth in article 8.18C 9 2 for transacting business in Texas without a
license could be recovered only in an independent suit with service of
process under the long arm statute, and could not be recovered through a
show-cause order in an earlier proceeding that had led to an injunction
prohibiting the transaction of business without a license.93 The show cause
order is served, of course, only on the attorneys in the earlier injunction
proceeding, while service under the long arm statute involves the mailing
of the citation to the defendant itself.
Another case arising during the survey period involved the issue
whether a minor defect in the service of process on a corporation was suffi-
cient to set aside a default judgment.94 The citation stated it was served by
delivery to "H. H. Michener, President" of the defendant. The president
was actually named "H. M. Michener." The default judgment was never-
theless upheld, in part on the theory that service on a corporate "presi-
dent" satisfies article 2.11 of the Business Corporation Act without more,95
so that it is unnecessary to include the president's name. 96 As a result,
misnaming the president did not invalidate the service.
The most important venue decision arising during the survey period is
Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v. Sames,97 which held that venue was proper
under subdivision 23 of the venue statute98 in a products liability case in
89. Mills v. Stinger Boats, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
90. Id. at 108; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b (Vernon 1964).
91. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.11 (Vernon 1956) governs the service of process
on domestic corporations. See Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co. v. Alley, 378 S.W.2d 129
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1964, writ refd n.r.e.). TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10
(Vernon 1956) or TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2029 (Vernon 1964) governs the service of
process on foreign corporations that have qualified to transact business in Texas.
92. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18C (Vernon 1956).
93. Cine-Matics, Inc. v. State, 578 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
94. NRTRX Corp. v. Story, 582 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
95. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.11 (Vernon 1956).
96. As an alternative ground, the court noted that the defendant admitted it had re-
ceived the process, and that the default had occurred because defendant's insurance agent
failed to forward it to defendant's attorneys. 582 S.W.2d at 227.
97. 575 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978), rei'd, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 28
(Oct. 20, 1979).
98. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(23) (Vernon 1964).
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the county where the injury occurred. One justice dissented, however, and
the Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error and reversed in a five-to-
four decision filed shortly after the end of the survey period. 99 Two other
interesting venue cases arose during the survey period. Rouse v. Shell Oil
Co. 100 involved the question whether Shell maintained an "agent or repre-
sentative" in Lavaca County for purposes of paragraph 27 of the venue
statute' 0 ' through the activities of Didner, a production foreman in charge
of the Sheridan Production Unit. Although Didner conducted most of his
Shell business from his Colorado County office, he periodically drove to
the seven production units that compose the Sheridan Unit. These seven
units are located in six different counties, and Didner testified that he tried
"to make all the leases in the field in a given month or something" al-
though not on any regular basis. Didner also travelled to particular field
locations for some "special types of operations."'' 0 2 The court concluded
that Didner's activities did not involve an "agency or representative" in
Lavaca County since that term relates to "duties or obligations. . . having
something to do with the corporate affairs of the principal, and must be
more than matters of manual or mechanical execution. The term connotes
some discretionary power conferred upon the employee."' 0 3 Even if
Didner's responsibilities met this test, the court concluded, suit would be
authorized only in Colorado County where he maintained his office and
not in the various surrounding counties that he visited periodically.
Amoco Production Co. v. Arenda/e'° rejected an argument that the dis-
paiate treatment of foreign and domestic corporations for venue pur-
poses'1 5 is inconsistent with the provision of the Texas Business
Corporation Act that states that a qualified foreign corporation "shall...
enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a domestic corpora-
tion."'0 6 This clause, the court stated involves parity only "in various
business dealings and thus had no effect on the venue statutes." 107
Receiverships. Two cases involving the drastic remedy of receivership
arose during the survey period, both concerning petitions by the State of
Texas. In Covington Knox, Inc. v. State' °8 the court upheld the appoint-
ment of a receiver for a brokerage firm that was involved in a scandal
relating to investments by the University of Houston. The size of the Uni-
versity's claim coupled with the defendant's misuse of funds cited in the
court's opinion make this appear to be a classic case for the remedy of
receivership.
99. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 28 (Oct. 20, 1979).
100. 577 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ dism'd).
101. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(27) (Vernon 1964).
102. 577 S.W.2d at 789.
103. Id.
104. 581 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
105. See 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 28, § 982.
106. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
107. 581 S.W.2d at 757.
108. 577 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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The same cannot be said for Theatres of America, Inc. v. State. °9 The
State obtained an ex parte receivership order against a corporation that
was showing allegedly pornographic films. The ostensible justification for
the receivership was the failure to qualify to transact business and to pay
franchise taxes. After the state court ordered the ex parte receivership, suit
was brought in federal court to enjoin claimed violations of first amend-
ment rights; a permanent injunction against the receivership was entered
after an evidentiary hearing upon a finding that the "court is strongly of
the opinion that the actions of the State in having the receiver appointed
and in shutting down the Mini-Vue Theater and bookstore were done in
bad faith and for the purpose of harassing Plaintiffs and suppressing their
constitutionally-protected conduct."'" This finding was based in part on
the fact that suit was brought by the Organized Crime Division of the Of-
fice of Attorney General rather than the Taxation Division, which ordina-
rily brings suits for unpaid franchise taxes. The case was then returned to
the state court, and the trial judge, responding to the federal restraining
order, dismissed the receivership but taxed one half of the costs against the
defendant. The theater complained that this taxation of costs constituted
an abuse of discretion and argued that all costs of this unconstitutional
proceeding should be assessed against the party that brought it. The Tyler
court of civil appeals agreed and ordered that all costs be assessed against
the State of Texas.
Miscellaneous. Varon t,. Richardson Professional Properties, Inc. "' in-
volves the recurring question whether a lease was entered into solely by a
corporation or whether the individual actually signing the lease was also
personally liable. The circumstances surrounding the execution were un-
usually ambiguous:
The lease as originally executed named defendant Harold H. Varon
as lessee in the opening paragraph and, at the end, was signed by
Harold H. Varon as lessee. Later a line was drawn through Varon's
name in the opening paragraph and "Richardson Clinical Labora-
tory" was written above it. The word "Inc." does not appear, nor is
there any other indication that the lessee was a corporation. Immedi-
ately beside these words appear the initials of the persons who signed
the lease and also a date more than two months later than the other
date in the document. No change was made with respect to the signa-
ture of "Harold H. Varon" at the end of the document.
The lessor brought the suit against "Dr. Harold H. Varon d/b/a/
Richardson Clinical Laboratory." Varon's answer denied liability in
the capacity in which he was sued ...."'
Varon filed an affidavit in response to the lessor's motion for summary
judgment stating that he understood, and he believed the lessor under-
stood, that only the corporation ("Richardson Chemical Laboratory, Inc.")
109. 577 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
110. Id. at 545. Apparently none of the federal court opinions are reported.
Ill. 583 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
112. Id. at 918.
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was to be responsible for the lease obligations. This affidavit was held to
be insufficient to avoid summary judgment, a result that is not surprising
considering the manner of execution. It should be clear that this kind of
litigation is completely avoidable with minimal precautions."'
In Huddleston v. Western National Bank" 4 the court upheld, over nu-
merous procedural and substantive objections, the disqualification of a
plaintiff shareholder in a derivative action. The grounds for disqualifica-
tion were that the plaintiff had been president of the bank when the al-
leged misconduct occurred, and that after filing the suit he offered to
compromise or dismiss it by selling his stock to the eighty percent owner
who was also named as a defendant. On these bare facts it is not possible
to determine the reasonableness of the court's conclusion since the opinion
does not state whether there are other members of the class who might
serve as plaintiffs. If there are, the conclusion of the court seems reason-
able because, as it points out, then the disqualified plaintiff shareholder is
likely to be named as a defendant by the other plaintiffs.
Finally, Henry S. Miller Co. v. Treo Enterprises"5 held that a corpora-
tion that is not registered as a real estate broker cannot sue for a commis-
sion even though all persons who dealt with the purchaser were registered
agents or brokers. This conclusion seems squarely based on the language
of the Real Estate License Act, 16 and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed
on the ground that "substantial compliance" with that Act is insuffi-
cient.' 17
III. SECURITIES REGULATION
Other than the amendment to the Texas Securities Act discussed ear-
lier, 18 most of the developments in securities regulation during the survey
period were at the federal level. Only one state appellate opinion'' 9 relat-
ing to the Texas Securities Act appeared during the survey period, and that
involved the routine application of the exemption for isolated dealings by
owners of oil, gas, and mineral interests.
The United States Supreme Court decided several important cases dur-
ing the survey period. The Fifth Circuit decision in Great Western United
113. See 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 28, § 588.
114. 577 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
115. 573 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978), aff'd, 585 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.
1979).
116. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
117. The Texas Supreme Court relied on a decision, Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v.
Micrea, 553 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977), rev'd, 572 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.
1978), that was sharply criticized in last year's Survey article because of its apparent com-
plete misunderstanding of partnership law. See Aldave, supra note 6, at 240-41. In the
course of this discussion Professor Aldave speculates that perhaps the Micrea decision can
be explained by "a policy of strict enforcement of the Real Estate License Act." This specu-
lation seems at least partially confirmed by the court's handling of Micrea in the principal
case.
118. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
119. Ginther v. Taub, 570 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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Corp. v. Kidwell, 2 ' holding that state tender offer statutes were preempted
121 wa rvse 22by the Williams Act, was reversed without reaching the merits. In
another important case, the Court gave apparent blessing to the idea that
discontinuance of derivative suits falls within the "business judgment" rule
so long as the directors voting to discontinue are independent and not in-
volved in the transactions in question. 123 Additionally, in a series of opin-
ions extending into the 1980 term, the Court has continued to cut back on
implied causes of action for violations of various provisions of federal stat-
utes. 1
24
The Fifth Circuit refused to extend the antifraud provisions of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 125 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934126 to a
transaction in which a bank advanced $2,250,000 to a corporation in ex-
change for a promissory note secured by a pledge of 2,250,000 shares of
newly created preferred stock that were irregularly issued and worthless. 
27
Relying on Fifth Circuit precedents, the court held that the pledge was not
a "purchase"' 128 and that the note was not a "security,"' 129 thereby destroy-
ing all bases of federal jurisdiction.
In a complex rule lob-5 case 130 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas noted that the motion for summary judgment
"requires this court to determine whether the pleadings ...fall within
[the] apparently contracting boundaries for federal judicial roles. It re-
quires a judgment not only that a retrenchment has been plainly signaled,
but also where today that moving line is 'properly' drawn."'' Except for
one rather minor count under rule lOb-5, claiming that it was misleading
to refer to a dividend restriction without adding that it was not a "true
bar," the court decided that the pleadings did not set forth claims falling
within the "retrenched" federal jurisdiction. 32
It is always desirable (but not always possible) to end these Annual
120. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), discussed in Aldave, supra note 6, at 263.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1976).
122. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710, 61 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1979).
123. Burks v. Lasker, 99 S. Ct. 1831, 61 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1979).
124. Transamerica Mortage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 62 L. Ed. 2d 146
(1979) (limiting plaintiffs cause of action to one for recission under § 215 of the Investor
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Surveys on a positive and favorable note. During the current survey pe-
riod the Securities and Exchange Commission has continued the trend be-
gun during the last survey period 33 of materially reducing the cost of
raising of capital by small concerns and simplifying the disposition of re-
stricted stock by persons who are "locked in."' 34 In particular, a new, sim-
plified registration form, S-18, may be used by nonreporting companies
selling publicly less than $5,000,000 of securities. 35 Moreover, a new rule
materially increasing the number of public offers that may be made with-
out registration under the 1933 Act was proposed during the survey pe-
riod, 136 and was acted upon early in 1980."3
133. See Aldave, supra note 6, at 262-63.
134. These actions include relaxed holding period requirements for certain purposes
under rules 144 and 148, SEC Release No. 33-6032, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144, .148 (1979), and
the wider use of a preliminary offering circular under Regulation A, SEC Release No. 33-
6075, 44 Fed. Reg. 33,362 (1979).
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